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Abstract
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others,
forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group
competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement
group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on
human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods
game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful,
lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the
game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and
extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinc-
tion produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group com-
parison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide
stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.
Introduction
Competition between groups has been implicated as a factor in the development of human
cooperation [1, 2]. Darwin famously observed that groups “including many members who . . .
were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would
be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection” [3]. Thus intergroup
competition increases the value of altruistic behavior within the group. Darwin’s view was
greeted with considerable skepticism, with critics arguing that selection takes place at the indi-
vidual level, and that individuals cannot sacrifice individual fitness in favor of the group [4, 5].
While a group of altruists might outcompete a group of free riders, altruism must first be able
to spread through a population for this situation to occur, and this is unlikely given the within-
group free rider problem. Recent research, drawing on historical data, argues that conflict was
prevalent enough and genetic diversity sufficiently extensive that intergroup conflict could sup-
port the development of altruism, especially when conflict threatened the survival of the group
itself [6–9]. However it is difficult to directly test the impact of intergroup competition on
cooperation using archival or observational data. The archeological evidence on conflict
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among hunter-gatherer societies is partial and limited [7], and conflicts among modern socie-
ties are too complex to isolate the role of specific behaviors such as cooperation and altruism.
Laboratory experiments are particularly useful for controlling the range of possible strate-
gies, payoffs and communication of information within and among groups. In this study we
isolate the effect of group-level selection by imposing a mechanism for group extinction and
measuring its impact on within-group cooperation. Two additional experimental conditions
rule out alternative hypotheses about our results, including an identical extinction mechanism
operating at the individual level, and an extinction-free group comparison treatment.
The tension between individual and group benefits is well captured by public goods (or
social dilemma) games. In these settings altruists pay a price for helping the group when they
choose to support provision of the public good. The choice for individuals is to allocate
resources to their own or to the group welfare. Contributions to the group benefit all members
of the group, but at a cost to the individual. These games have been studied extensively in the
social sciences to examine the factors that promote or undermine efficiency-enhancing cooper-
ation [10–13]. The public goods game is an ideal vehicle for our experiment.
Importantly, we do not address how group-level selection might arise or operate, nor on the
psychological mechanisms that might be involved in its success or failure, but rather we imple-
ment group-level selection and directly test its impact on behavior. Others have focused on
competition between groups and noted that rivalries are sufficient to boost cooperative behav-
ior to some extent [14–17]. We introduce an extreme form of group competition, where the
survival of the lower-earning group is threatened. We implement group-level extinction in the
lab by announcing that the lowest-earning group in the first block of the experiment will not be
allowed to play the game in the second block, instead earning only their endowment each
period.
Our findings demonstrate that group-level extinction produces a remarkable effect on coop-
eration, resulting in very high contributions to the provision of the public good. We rule out
alternative explanations for the high contributions by running two additional control treat-
ments. First, group comparison alone (without extinction) might enhance intergroup competi-
tiveness, and therefore cause higher contributions. Evidence that competitive pressures can
affect behavior is pervasive in laboratory experiments [18]. Merely giving subjects information
on their relative choices or earnings can boost contributions [19–22]. For this reason we con-
duct a treatment with group comparison in the form of information about group-level perfor-
mance, but without extinction. Second, the threat of extinction alone might be responsible for
higher cooperation: that is, subjects facing the possibility of extinction may contribute more to
their group, even when selection is at the individual rather than the group level. For this reason,
we conduct a treatment where the lowest-earning individuals become extinct. Neither factor
alone increases contributions substantially relative to the group extinction treatment.
Materials and Methods
All experiments were carried out in the LINEEX laboratory at the University of Valencia in
2007 and 2008. At the time LINEEX had a blanket exemption from the Ethics Commission at
the University of Valencia. The exemption covered all laboratory experiments in which: subject
decisions were made over a computerized network; subjects were given random identification
numbers; no physiological measures were collected; subjects were privately paid; and no demo-
graphic information was collected about subjects. This experiment fell under that exemption.
As part of the consenting procedure, subjects read a statement detailing the fact that any infor-
mation collected during the course of an experiment would be kept strictly anonymous and
that a subject could exit the experiment at any time without penalty. This consenting document
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was displayed at the time subjects voluntarily entered into the subject pool for the LINEEX lab-
oratory. Contacts for the Ethics Committee at Valencia were posted on the website in the event
that a subject had any complaints. No personal information was collected for any of the sub-
jects. The only identifier linking subject actions across the data was a randomly assigned identi-
fication number. Only behavioral data was collected. No demographic, attitudinal or any other
information was collected from subjects.
A total of 168 subjects took part in the experiment conducted at the experimental laboratory
at the University of Valencia (LINEEX). Participants were recruited using LINEEX’s own
online recruiting software and were undergraduate students (mostly from business and eco-
nomics) of the University of Valencia. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four to
play a standard linear public goods game with a marginal per capita return of 0.5. They were
told that they would participate in two Blocks of ten rounds each.
All sessions used a common protocol, apart from the details of the games themselves. Upon
arrival, subjects were welcomed and randomly seated at the visually separated computer termi-
nals. The experiment was implemented with Z-Tree software [23]. Participants interacted
anonymously via computer screens such that subjects did not know which of the other partici-
pants were in their group. Subjects were given a written set of instructions (available in S2 File),
which the experimenter read aloud. The instructions included a set of control questions (quiz)
about how choices translate into earnings and about the composition of groups and sections.
Subjects had to answer all the questions correctly before the experiment could continue.
Instructions used neutral language (e.g., “extinction” was not mentioned). The total earnings
equaled the sum of their total earnings over all 20 periods and were paid privately in cash at the
end of the experiment. On average subjects earned 17 Euros. Each experimental session lasted
on average 90 minutes.
The experimental design consists of four treatments in a between-subject design. S1 Table
and S1 File include a summary of the different experimental treatments. In each treatment
there are two blocks, each block consisting of a ten-period public goods game, with subjects
randomly assigned to groups of size four at the beginning of the experiment. In Block 1, groups
are randomly assigned to one of four possible treatments, while Block 2 is identical across all
groups.
In the Baseline treatment, individuals participate in a standard public goods game. Given
that its only purpose is to serve as a control treatment, we implement two minor variants of the
standard public goods game. In Baseline 20 individuals play the public goods game for 20
rounds (the total number of rounds of Block 1 and 2). In Baseline 10 they participate in Block 1
for ten rounds and, after a surprise restart [24], in Block 2 for ten rounds. We opted for this
dual baseline because some participants in the other three treatments participate in a twenty
round experiment (two blocks of ten rounds, with the same groups throughout), while others
only in ten (two blocks of ten rounds, but with groups re-matched after the first set). Our anal-
ysis demonstrates that every treatment effect holds when using as control either of the two
baseline treatments, or both. Additional statistical analysis is given by S1 Fig and S3–S5 Tables.
The second treatment is Group Extinction. Here the groups play the public goods game for
ten rounds in Block 1, and are then ranked by total earnings at the end of the Block. Subjects
are told at the beginning of the experiment that they will find out whether they are in the top 2/
3rds or the bottom 1/3rd of the groups at the conclusion of the ten-round block. The lower-
ranked groups are dissolved–they become extinct. The remaining groups participate in Block
2. Extinction in this context means that the subjects are no longer allowed to participate in the
public goods game, but continue to sit at their computers and receive the same endowment as
the other participants each round. To preserve anonymity they were asked to perform a similar
task each period with no consequences on earnings.
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The third treatment, Group Comparison allows us to test whether information about group
ranking alone is responsible for any treatment effect from Group Extinction. At the end of
Block 1, we rank the groups and inform subjects, as in Group Extinction, about whether they
are in the top 2/3rds or bottom 1/3rd of groups. Subjects are told at the beginning of the experi-
ment that they will receive information about the relative performance of their group at the
end of the first block, before moving on to Block 2. There is no extinction: all individuals par-
ticipate in both blocks of the game.
The fourth treatment, Individual Extinction, allows us test the hypothesis that the threat of
extinction alone is responsible for any treatment effects of Group Extinction. Here we rank
individual subjects according to their performance and remove the lowest performing 1/3rd of
subjects, across all groups, from the experiment. Subjects are told at the beginning of the exper-
iment that the lowest-performing individuals will be removed from their groups, and the
remaining subjects reconstituted into new groups of four for Block 2. Note that, as in the
Group Extinction treatment, performance determines the fate of participants. The only differ-
ence between the two conditions is the selection level: individuals versus groups. As in Group
Extinction, subjects who go extinct continue to receive an endowment, but do not play the
game. This is the only treatment where the composition of groups changes from the first to the
second block.
Most of the elements of the design are common across conditions. Subjects are randomly
assigned to groups of four where they remain for ten periods (or 20 in the case of Baseline20).
Every period each subject is given a new endowment (50 monetary units–MUs) and must
decide how to allocate the MUs between a private or to a group account. The private account
returns one MU for each invested unit. All MUs placed in the group account pay off .5MU to
all members of the group. Thus from the point of view of the individual, the return to each MU
invested in the group account is .5MU, but from the point of view of the group, the joint return
is 2MU. The social dilemma is such that everyone is better off if all MUs are invested in the
group account, but each player has an incentive to free ride.
Subjects also observe the contributions of others in their group for all prior rounds. Each
round, the contributions to the public good are ranked from highest to lowest, but that infor-
mation is not linked to a subject’s identification number to preserve anonymity. Subjects are
told nothing about the contributions of the individuals in the other groups.
In most of the public goods literature, the theoretical predictions are based on the standard
assumptions of rationality (payoff maximization) and common knowledge of rationality.
Under these assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium of the standard game is for all players to con-
tribute zero. Therefore the standard equilibrium prediction for the Baseline, Group Compari-
son, and for Block 2 of all treatments, is to contribute zero. In Individual Extinction, free riding
is still a dominant strategy, as anyone who contributes will enhance the likelihood of his own
extinction. In Group Extinction, the standard prediction applies to surviving groups in the sec-
ond block. In equilibrium, earnings are identical to those obtained by non-surviving groups
that continue to receive their endowment. Because there is no incentive to survive in equilib-
rium, the within-group free rider problem still dominates, and the equilibrium prediction is
again zero contributions.
Under standard economic theory, then, free riding is always a dominant strategy in all treat-
ments, so that none of these experimental conditions should affect the behavior of individuals
(see a similar discussion by [21]). We note that under other assumptions about beliefs, multiple
equilibrium can be sustained in all treatments. We did not elicit beliefs in this study, so are
unable to test alternative assumptions about beliefs.
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Results
Fig 1 presents the distribution of decisions across conditions. The primary finding is that
Group Extinction leads to greater contributions to the public good (92% of the endowment, on
average) than any other treatment (35% in the Baseline, 36% in Individual Extinction, and 42%
in Group Comparison). Because average contributions and earnings are intrinsically linked in
the game, participants in the Group Extinction treatment earn substantially more than those in
other treatments. Group Extinction leads to a remarkably large and significant contribution
increase when compared with the pooled Baseline data. S3 Table contains the results of simple
non-parametric tests of treatment effects. S4 and S5 Tables provide parametric analysis.
In order to test whether treatment differences are due to relative comparisons, we compare
Group Extinction and Group Comparison. Before making any decisions, subjects in both treat-
ments receive exactly the same instructions concerning the information to be revealed at the
end of the first block about the ranking of groups. The difference is that in Group Extinction
one group out of each three, the one with the lowest performance, no longer participates in the
experiment in the second block. The difference is significant (p< .001) with much higher con-
tributions in Group Extinction.
In order to test whether the results are due to the threat of extinction alone, we compare
Group Extinction with Individual Extinction. In both treatments one-third of the subjects
become extinct by design. The difference is that in Individual Extinction it is the lowest-earning
subjects across all groups who are removed from the game, while in Group Extinction it is the
Fig 1. Aggregate Block 1 data for each treatment.Data are the percentage Monetary Units contributed,
represented as a box and whiskers plot. The box corresponds to the 25th-75th percentiles, and the line indicates
the median value. Whiskers correspond to 1.5 times the interquartile range. Only one value per individual
participant (their average contributions) is used in each block. Fig 1 pools the data of both baseline treatments. S5
Fig shows the baseline data disaggregated, while S6 Table shows averages and standard deviations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157840.g001
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lowest-earning group. The difference is again significant (p-value<0.001). While Group Extinc-
tion boosts contribution rates, the same is not true for Individual Extinction or Group Compari-
son: neither is significantly different from the Baseline. See S3 Table for details on the non-
parametric tests.
Recall that Block 2 is identical across all experimental treatments for the surviving subjects,
and consists of ten rounds of a standard public goods game without information or extinction.
In this block subjects make decisions in the same public goods game, knowing that the experi-
ment will conclude at the end of the block. Fig 2 presents the distribution of Block 2 contribu-
tions to the public good by condition. Comparing outcomes within Block 2, contributions in
Group Extinction remain well above the other treatments in Block 2 (62% relative to 25% in the
Baseline, 35% in Group Comparison and 23% in Individual Extinction), and all pairwise com-
parisons between Group Extinction and the other treatments are significant at least at the 5%
level. (The p-values comparing Group Extinction to the Baseline, Group Comparison and Indi-
vidual Extinction treatments are smaller than 0.02, 0.03 and 0.003, respectively).
Comparing Block 1 with Block 2 contributions, (Fig 1 and Fig 2) we observe two main
changes. First, while contributions in the three control treatments (the Baseline, the Group
Comparison and the Individual Extinction) do not significantly differ across blocks, the decline
in the Group Extinction condition is significant. A Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test
shows that differences between Block 1 and Block 2 are significant in the Group Extinction con-
dition (p<0.01), but not in the Group Comparison treatment (p<0.15) or the Baseline with the
surprise restart (p<0.25). Not surprisingly, and in line with overwhelming experimental
Fig 2. Aggregate data for Block 2 by treatment. Data are the percentageMonetary Units contributed and
represented as a box and whiskers plot. The box corresponds to the 25th-75th percentiles, and the line indicates
the median value. Whiskers correspond to 1.5 times the interquartile range. One value per individual participant
(average contributions across all rounds) is used in each block. See S2 Table for more detail.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157840.g002
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evidence (9) contributions in the last ten rounds of Baseline20 (with no surprise restart) contri-
butions are lower (p<0.02). The difference between Block 1 and 2 is marginally significant in
the Individual Extinction condition, using a MannWhitney rank sum test (this test is used
because the composition of groups is not the same).
Fig 3 presents the average contribution by period in both blocks, across conditions. All treat-
ments have a slight negative trend in contributions towards the end of Block 1 (Fig 1A), but dif-
ferences between Group Extinction and the other three treatments in the initial ten rounds are
substantial and statistically significant in any round. Under the threat of group-level extinction
the provision of the public good is higher, and remains higher in every period (at above 80% in
any period), while in all the other treatments subjects begin by contributing on average just
under half of their endowment to the public good and contributions decline, consistent with
findings from almost all public goods experiments [11].
All treatments show a “restart effect” with higher contributions in round 11 than round 10,
except Group Extinction. In the three control treatments subjects demonstrate a positive restart
effect, with contributions bouncing back to levels similar to the start of Block 1, a phenomenon
commonly observed in public goods games [25]. No restart effect is observed in Group Extinc-
tion; instead contributions begin close to their levels in Block 1, and decline steadily throughout
Block 2.
We see this post-extinction decline as a valuable robustness check on the long-term effec-
tiveness of Group Extinction. Once the selection mechanism is removed, contributions decline
faster than in the other treatments. While average contributions remain uniformly higher for
the Group Extinction treatment compared with the other treatments in Block 2, subjects in this
condition decrease their contributions to the public good from 85% to 28% from the beginning
to the end of Block 2. Interestingly, no single difference across treatments is statistically signifi-
cant in round 20 of the experiment.
Discussion
One of the most important puzzles in the study of human evolution is the prevalence of altruistic
behavior in humans. Darwin asserted early on that group competition is an important source of
altruism: “When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition,
if (other things being equal) the one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympathetic
and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend
each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other (Darwin, 1871, p. 113).”
The concept of group-level selection is both attractive and controversial. Biologists since
Darwin have debated whether selection at the group level can support altruism, given the fact
that free riders within the group have higher levels of fitness. From the gene’s eye view, altruists
can never prevail [4, 26]. These opponents of the group selection argument also assert that
there are hardly any instances of group selection, so its effect would necessarily be small. Others
argue that group-level selection is so abundant throughout human evolution that it is more
than sufficient to explain why humans are altruistic [27]. These and other researchers refer to
multi-level selection, with group-level selection one among many possible mechanisms sup-
porting altruistic behavior, and argue that the net effect will depend on the relative strength of
the different levels. Furthermore, the idea of cultural selection, developed by anthropologists
addressing the same question about the prevalence of altruism, provides a mechanism for
acquired group norms of altruistic behavior to be transmitted to future generations without
relying on gene-level evolutionary processes [2, 8, 9, 28, 29]. The debate between proponents
and opponents focuses on mathematical models and is hampered by limited observational
data. Finding clear empirical instances of group-level selection is difficult (but see [30, 31]).
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Many open questions remain about the viability and effect of group-level selection as well as
the exact mechanism through which it might support altruistic behavior. However, one of its
Fig 3. Trends in contributions broken out by treatment. (A) represents the first Block when subjects are
being treated. (B) represents the second Block following the treatment condition. Subjects who became
“extinct” are excluded from Block 2. Points represent the average individual contributions for that period. 95
percent confidence intervals are plotted for each of the treatments and points. The points are connected to
better give a sense of the trends over periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157840.g003
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central questions can be addressed in our simple lab experiment. We create an environment
where free riding results in higher payoffs within groups, but competition between groups
ensures that altruistic groups are more successful. We ask: What is the effect of group-level
selection on within-group cooperation in this setting? Our experiment implements an extreme
form of group competition in the lab in the form of group extinction: the lowest-earning
among three groups playing the public goods game in the lab becomes “extinct,” in the sense
that they are no longer allowed to play the public goods game.
Our main finding affirms Darwin’s assertion: Imposing group extinction in the lab results
in a dramatic increase in cooperation. The effect is large, even in a setting where the Nash equi-
librium of the game is not altered by the extinction mechanism. Control treatments consisting
of information-based group comparison and individual-level extinction generate no significant
effect relative to a baseline. Group extinction leads to enhanced cooperation as long as the
selection mechanism is present; once it is removed, contributions remain higher for a time, but
fall quickly towards the Nash equilibrium of zero contributions. The culture of cooperation
engendered by the group extinction mechanism has only a brief longer-term carryover after
the mechanism is removed.
Of course, other researchers have examined different mechanisms involving group competi-
tion to overcome the free rider problem. The mechanisms in these studies include competition
for a prize [17, 32], and various inter-group comparisons [22, 33]. Mechanisms not involving
group competition, such as sorting of group members [16], or varying forms of communica-
tion and sanctioning [13] can also mitigate the free rider problem. In our case, group extinction
solves the free rider problem, without communication or sanctions.
Why does Group Extinction enhance cooperation? We cannot address whether this change
in the environment triggers a psychological mechanism related to group threat [34] or solidifies
group identity [35, 36], or perhaps both.
Darwin’s conjecture, that groups may enjoy an advantage whose members are “ready to aid
one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good,” is affirmed with this study. We
show that even when no other cooperation-reinforcing mechanism is present, the threat of
group extinction is sufficiently powerful to motivate cooperation and increase within-group
cooperation. This result supports the notion that competition between groups is part of what
has cultivated human cooperation.
Supporting Information
S1 Fig. Percentage of Group Contributions in the First Block broken out by treatment.
Standard error bars are overlaid on the figure.
(TIF)
S2 Fig. Percentage of Group Contributions in the Second Block broken out by treatment.
Standard error bars are overlaid on the figure.
(TIF)
S3 Fig. Distributions of decisions across all 20 periods. The vertical axis indicates the per-
centage of contributions to the public good. The horizontal axis indicates the amount of the
contribution to the public good. Values at the extreme left indicate zero contributions. Values
at the extreme right indicate contributing everything.
(TIF)
S4 Fig. Distributions of decisions across the First Block (periods 1–10). The vertical axis
indicates the percentage of contributions to the public good. The horizontal axis indicates the
amount of the contribution to the public good. Values at the extreme left indicate zero
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contributions. Values at the extreme right indicate contributing everything.
(TIF)
S5 Fig. Distributions of decisions across the Second Block (periods 11–20). The vertical axis
indicates the percentage of contributions to the public good. The horizontal axis indicates the
amount of the contribution to the public good. Values at the extreme left indicate zero contri-
butions. Values at the extreme right indicate contributing everything.
(TIF)
S6 Fig. Disaggregated Plots of Baseline data.We use data from 2 Baseline experiments: (i)
Baseline with surprise restart (10 + 10 rounds: 6 independent group observations) and (ii)
Baseline repeated for 20 rounds (7 independent group observations). Apart from the difference
in period 11 we do not find statistically significant differences between them (see S6 Table).
(TIF)
S7 Fig. Comparison of Intact Groups Across Block 1 and Block 2. A comparison of the per-
formance of intact groups that played both in Block 1 (horizontal axes) and Block 2 (vertical
axes). Any marker above the 45-degree dashed line represents a group that contributes more in
the second block than in the first, and the opposite for markers below the line. Not surprisingly,
observations from the Group Extinction treatment are all at the right of the diagram (as contri-
butions are high in the first block and lower in the second). However, when we compare per-
formance across conditions in the second block, using the vertical axes, differences vanish. The
figure contains information about the performance of surviving groups in the last round (as
grey diamonds). In most groups contribution collapses to zero, or gets close to it, and only two
groups out of eight still contribute more than 50% of their endowment.
(TIF)
S8 Fig. Average contributions byWinners and Losers.Average percentage contributions by indi-
viduals are plotted for each period. 95 percent confidence intervals are plotted separately for each
treatment and type of individual. The data are for the first Block of data. Ex post we know who
remained in the experiment and who did not. We use this information to differentiate between
“winners” (who continued in the experiment) and “losers” (who did not continue in the experi-
ment). The lower portion of the figure shows that under the individual extinction (IE) treatment,
those who were “winners” normally contributed less than the “losers” in that treatment. However,
the differences are not statistically significant. The opposite is the case under the group extinction
(GE) treatment. There “winners” contributed somewhat more than “losers” although this difference
is not statistically significant. Overall, the behavior of “winners” and “losers” is similar.
(TIF)
S9 Fig. Contribution stage. It is the same for each treatment.
(TIF)
S10 Fig. Information screen after contribution stage. It is the same for each treatment.
(TIF)
S11 Fig. Information screen after the first block for Individual Extinction Low Earner.
(TIF)
S12 Fig. Information screen after the first block for Individual Extinction High Earner.
(TIF)
S13 Fig. Information screen after the first block for Group Extinction and Group Compari-
son Low Earning Groups. In both treatments subjects are given the same information. Only in
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the Group Extinction treatment do those groups exit the experiment.
(TIF)
S14 Fig. Information screen after the first block for Group Extinction and Group Compari-
son High Earning Groups. In both treatments subjects are given the same information.
(TIF)
S1 File. Details about Experimental Design.
(PDF)
S2 File. Written Instructions for Experiment.
(PDF)
S1 Table. Summary of Treatments.
(PDF)
S2 Table. Means (standard deviations) of contributions at the group level.Means are pooled
over all periods and then broken out by the first and second blocks.
(PDF)
S3 Table. P-values for Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests for pairwise treatment differences.
The comparisons are for all 20 periods, the first block and the second block. Each comparison
includes contributions and earnings information. In the table BSL = Baseline; GC = Group
Comparison; IE = Individual Extinction; and GE = Group Extinction.
(PDF)
S4 Table. Individual Level Regressions (Panel Random-effects generalized least squares).
Analysis is across all periods and then by first and second block. Baseline treatment is the omit-
ted category.
(PDF)
S5 Table. Individual Level Regressions (Panel Random-effects generalized least squares).
An additional control for the period is included. Baseline treatment is the omitted category.
(PDF)
S6 Table. Averages by groups across periods for the baseline treatment. The first part of the
table indicates the total average MUs given by the group (out of a possible 200 MUs that could
be given in each period). The second part of the table presents Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
between the Baseline treatments.
(PDF)
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